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OPINION OF THE COURT                         
_____________ 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge
 
. 
Roderick Johnson filed multiple petitions under 
Pennsylvania’s Post-Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa. 
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Cons. Stat. §§ 9541-9546, unsuccessfully claiming that 
violations of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), 
undermined his conviction for first-degree murder. He then 
sought habeas corpus relief in the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on the same basis, 
and, having been denied relief there, he has appealed to our 
court.  
 
Johnson had been convicted and sentenced to life in 
prison without any physical evidence or eyewitness testimony 
tying him to the crime. The testimony of George Robles, a 
“friend” of Johnson’s, that Johnson had confessed his guilt to 
him, was clearly pivotal to the case. What makes this case 
unusual is that it was not until discovery in Johnson’s federal 
habeas case that substantial previously undisclosed evidence 
was uncovered and revealed that at the time Robles testified, 
he was under investigation for his role in a shooting, an 
assault, and multiple shots-fired incidents. The undisclosed 
evidence also showed that Robles, who was never arrested or 
charged for any crimes despite his having had repeated 
dealings with the police in investigations involving guns and 
drugs, did in fact supply the police with information 
concerning an unrelated crime when his own involvement in 
an assault came under investigation. The jury never heard any 
of this impeachment evidence because when Johnson sought 
discovery of all information in the possession of the local 
police concerning any criminal activity of Robles, charged or 
uncharged, the District Attorney who prosecuted Johnson 
represented to the state court that it had no information or 
police reports naming Robles as a suspect—a patent 
misrepresentation.  
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The District Court denied Johnson’s petition 
concluding that the undisclosed evidence would not have 
been admissible at Johnson’s murder trial and thus could not 
establish a Brady violation. We believe that this case deserves 
a more thorough and exacting evaluation and for the reasons 
set forth below, we will reverse and remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
I. Factual Background and Procedural History 
 
A. Pre-trial  
 
On the evening of November 1, 1996, Jose Bernard 
Martinez was shot to death in Reading, Pennsylvania. The 
police discovered Martinez later that evening after an eye-
witness, Pearl Torres, reported seeing a man chase down and 
shoot another man along Schuylkill Avenue in Reading. 
Torres described the shooter as a black man wearing dark 
clothes, jeans, and a checkered jacket, but was unable to 
identify the shooter. 
 
In the weeks following the shooting, the Reading 
police approached George Robles seeking information about 
the shooting. He denied any knowledge of the incident. They 
also interviewed Mylta Velazquez, Johnson’s live-in 
girlfriend, who similarly denied possessing any information. 
As the investigation continued, the police returned to Robles 
repeatedly, interviewing him between six and twelve times. 
Again and again, Robles claimed to have no knowledge of the 
shooting.  
 
Finally, on December 17, 1996, Robles, indicating that 
his “consci[ence] was killing [him],” relented and gave the 
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police a statement implicating Johnson and Richard Morales 
in the murder of Martinez. (JA 943). Robles told investigators 
that Johnson had come straight to his home after the shooting 
and confessed to his involvement. According to Robles, 
Johnson admitted to confronting Martinez at a Getty’s Mart 
about a debt Martinez owed Johnson’s friend David, firing his 
gun twice in the store, chasing down Martinez in a van 
because he fled when Johnson’s gun jammed, and then 
shooting Martinez in the street. Robles told the police that 
Johnson said that he bumped into a girl after the shooting and 
mistaking her for Morales, yelled to her that he had just 
“killed that guy.” (JA 510). Robles also informed the 
investigators that Morales turned up at his home about 15 
minutes after Johnson left and confirmed Johnson’s account 
of the shooting. Morales apparently added that he had fired an 
additional shot at Martinez after Johnson fled to ensure that 
Johnson had “finished the job.” (Id.).  
 
On the same day that Robles recanted his denials, 
Shannon Sanders came forward to give a statement to the 
police. Sanders told the investigators that on the night of the 
shooting she had been walking in an alley in the immediate 
vicinity of Schuylkill Avenue when she encountered a dark-
skinned man dressed in baggy clothes and carrying a 9-
millimeter semiautomatic handgun. The man spontaneously 
confessed that he had just shot a man. Sanders, who was an 
acquaintance of Johnson’s, could not identify the man she 
encountered, despite having seen his face. Although Sanders 
waited six weeks before speaking with investigators, she 
recounted her story to numerous family and friends, including 
Velazquez, in the meantime. 
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Three days after Robles and Sanders gave their 
statements, Velazquez retracted her denial as well, telling the 
police that Johnson, now her ex-boyfriend, had confessed to 
killing Martinez as part of a hit. In her police statement, 
Velazquez denied ever having seen Johnson with a gun. 
 
Thereafter, Richard Morales and Roderick Johnson 
were arrested and charged in connection with the murder of 
Martinez. 
 
In February 1997, George Robles was arrested as a 
material witness after failing to appear in court to testify 
against Johnson. Robles was incarcerated for approximately 
two months in Berks County Prison as a result. During his 
incarceration—Robles’s first—he wrote a letter to Detective 
Cabrera of the Reading Police asking to be released early and 
offering to “do anything” in exchange. (JA 979-80). Robles 
was released from prison only after he testified at the 
preliminary hearing.  
 
On September 13, 1997, more than ten months after 
the shooting, Luz Cintron, Robles’s girlfriend, approached the 
investigators with her knowledge of the shooting. Cintron told 
police that the night of the shooting Morales had turned up at 
Robles’s home where Cintron overheard him telling Robles 
that he and Johnson had seen Martinez at an IGA and that 
Johnson had confronted him about money he owed their 
friend Shaun Bridges. Cintron also claimed that Morales said 
that when Martinez ran, Johnson took off chasing him on 
foot, eventually catching him and shooting him in the back. 
According to Cintron’s police statement, Morales told Robles 
that after Johnson fled, Morales pulled up in a car, got out, 
and shot Martinez again. Cintron recalled Johnson coming to 
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Robles’s home shortly after Morales left and refusing to 
answer any questions about the incident. Cintron told the 
police that the next day she overheard Johnson telling another 
occupant of the house that he had shot Martinez and fled after 
hearing a girl shout “here come the cops.” (JA 505).  
 
Prior to trial, Johnson brought a motion to compel 
discovery. The state court held a hearing on the motion on 
May 15, 1998. At the hearing, Johnson sought “all 
information and reports in possession of the Reading Police 
Department and DANET concerning any and all criminal 
activities charged and uncharged, past and present of George 
Robles.” (JA 310-11). It was Johnson’s theory that “Robles 
was actively engaged in criminal enterprises in Reading. . . . 
[And] that certain police officer[s] were aware of that, that 
that’s been for some reason, uncharged and we’d like to find 
out why that is and what they know about him. [Because] 
[t]his guy has no arrest record.” (Id. at 309-10).  In response, 
the District Attorney denied the existence of any such 
evidence, stating that he was “unaware of any reports which 
state[] that . . . [Robles] is a suspect of a crime.” (Id. at 313). 
The court inquired of the District Attorney, “[s]o, we agree 
that you are stating that he has no convictions and that you 
have no information about any police reports which name him 
as a suspect?” (Id. at 314). “That’s correct,” replied the 
District Attorney, “I believe that there was a report turned 
over . . . where Mr. Robles may have been shot at . . . that’s 
the only report I am aware of Mr. Robles being involved in 
any criminal activities.” (Id.)  
 
At the hearing, Johnson also sought discovery into 
whether any of the Commonwealth’s witnesses were on 
probation or parole, or had received any agreements, 
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inducements, or promises with respect to their testimony. (Id. 
at 318-19). The District Attorney represented that “there have 
been no promises or inducement to any of the witnesses . . . 
there are no plea agreements, there are no pending cases that I 
am aware of and there’s been no promise for the testimony.” 
(Id. at 319).  
 
The state court, relying on the representations of the 
District Attorney, did not order the discovery Johnson sought 
with respect to Robles. (Id. at 323).  
 
B. Undisclosed Evidence 
 
In reality, the Commonwealth possessed copious 
evidence linking Robles to various criminal investigations in 
addition to information bearing on the motives of Cintron and 
Velazquez that it never disclosed to Johnson. It was not until 
nearly ten years later when the District Court granted Johnson 
discovery during the habeas corpus proceedings that all of the 
undisclosed evidence came to light. This evidence includes:  
 
• A police investigation into a February 27, 1996 
assault in which Robles, who was under suspicion 
for threatening two individuals with a firearm and 
discharging his firearm into the air, offered to 
provide the police with information concerning an 
unrelated murder investigation; 
 
• A police investigation into an April 25, 1996 
shooting in which Robles’s fingerprint was found 
on a cigar box containing cash and 103 bags of 
crack cocaine that was recovered from the shooting 
suspect; and in which police officers returned to 
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Robles a safe recovered during the investigation 
containing a gun and a cell phone; 
 
• A police investigation into an August 1, 1997 
shots-fired incident in which Robles was identified 
at the scene, questioned by police, found to possess 
a handgun with similar casings as those fired, and 
had the weapon confiscated but returned to him at a 
later date; 
 
• A police investigation of a September 18, 1997 
shots-fired incident in which Robles was 
questioned as a suspect but never charged; 
 
• A police investigation of a November 7, 1997 
shots-fired incident in which Robles’s gun was 
used but he was never charged;  
 
• Police reports including statements by victims or 
witnesses attesting to Robles’s involvement in 
drug-dealing; 
 
• Robles’s statement that a Reading Police officer 
told him that his “potpourri and marijuana did not 
mix too well,” but he was not arrested and that 
certain Reading Police officers complimented him 
about his intelligence in the way he “ran things”; 
 
• A Reading police report dated July 7, 1998, (two 
days before Cintron testified at Johnson’s trial), in 
which Cintron is listed as a suspect in an assault 
case that ultimately resulted in assault charges 
against her being dropped; and 
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• A police report documenting that Cintron lied to 
the police about Robles’s whereabouts during an 
investigation into his involvement in a February 27, 
1996 shooting.  
 
Additionally, defense investigators swore to affidavits 
representing that Velazquez testified against Johnson only 
after being threatened by the investigating officers with 
criminal conspiracy charges and that Cintron was coerced 
into testifying by the investigating police officers and Robles. 
 
Johnson did not have the benefit of this evidence in 
preparing for trial, and the jury never got a chance to consider 
this evidence in weighing the credibility of the testimony 
against Johnson.  
 
C. Evidence at Trial 
 
 At Johnson’s trial,1
 
 the Commonwealth presented no 
physical evidence or eyewitness testimony connecting 
Johnson to the shooting of Martinez. Instead, the 
Commonwealth’s case consisted of two eyewitnesses who 
were unable to make an identification of the shooter and three 
witnesses claiming to have heard Johnson confess to killing 
Martinez. 
Witness Pearl Torres testified that at approximately on 
11:15 p.m. on November 1, 1996, she was driving on 
Schuylkill Avenue in Reading when she observed two men 
                                                 
1Interestingly, Morales was tried separately and his trial 
resulted in a hung jury and a mistrial. (JA 316). 
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run out into the road in front of her; the second man was 
carrying a semiautomatic firearm and chasing the first man. 
According to her testimony, he fired one shot, causing the 
victim to fall to the ground in a fetal position, and then 
crossed the street and proceeded to fire three more shots into 
the victim before running off toward the 100 block of Elm 
Street. Torres was unable to identify the shooter at trial. 
 
 The Commonwealth presented the testimony of 
Shannon Sanders that she was walking up an alley just off 
Schuylkill Avenue on November 1, 1996, when she heard 
three shots fired. Sanders told the jury that a man ran by her 
moments later carrying a 9-millimeter semiautomatic 
handgun and said, “Yo, that mother’s fucker [sic] dead. . . . I 
just killed him.” (JA 785). She testified that she told him to 
run and he proceeded to run north on Elm Street. Although 
Sanders was an acquaintance of Johnson’s, she could not 
identify him as the man she saw that night because she only 
“glance[d]” the “side of his face” for a “quick instant.” (JA 
783, 785).   
 
 The principal witness against Johnson at trial was 
George Robles. Robles testified that on the night of 
November 1, 1996, he was at home with several friends 
smoking a considerable amount of marijuana and consuming 
a significant amount of beer. According to Robles, Johnson, 
his “best friend,” showed up out of breath around midnight 
and confessed that he had just killed someone. Johnson said 
that he and Morales had confronted Martinez at a 
convenience store on Schuylkill Avenue about a debt he owed 
their friend. Johnson fired at Martinez in the store but his gun 
jammed and Martinez took off running down the street. 
According to Robles’s testimony, Johnson and Morales got 
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into a van and drove off in pursuit of Martinez; Johnson 
exited the van, ran to Martinez, and fired several shots at him. 
Johnson told Robles that after the shooting he encountered a 
girl nearby, and thinking she was Morales, told her that he 
had shot the victim. Robles testified that Johnson asked him 
to keep his gun, which Robles described as a 9-millimeter 
semiautomatic, but Robles refused and Johnson left with the 
weapon. 
 
 Robles told the jury that Morales came to his home 
looking for Johnson a short while later. Morales confirmed 
Johnson’s account of the shooting to Robles, and added that 
after Johnson shot Martinez, he (Morales) had circled back 
around in the van and fired another shot into the victim “to 
make sure that [Johnson] did the job right.” Robles identified 
a black Glock firearm as the type of gun that Morales 
possessed that night.  
 
 Given the importance of Robles’s testimony, 
Johnson’s counsel tried mightily to undercut his credibility at 
trial. The defense cross-examined Robles at length about his 
involvement in the “Nyte Life Clique” (the “NLC”), which 
defense counsel suggested was a gang, his alleged drug-
dealing, his feud with Johnson after Johnson left the NLC, 
and his relationship with the Reading police. Robles denied 
any involvement in drug dealing or gang activity. Defense 
counsel insinuated that the Reading police overlooked 
Robles’s criminal activities because he provided them with 
information, including fabricating testimony against Johnson. 
However, because Robles had no convictions or even arrests 
(outside of the material witness warrant), the cross-
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examination consisted of little more than counsel’s 
allegations and Robles’s repeated denials.2
 
  
 Luz Cintron testified at trial that both Johnson and 
Morales visited the home she shared with Robles on the night 
of the shooting. But, contradicting Robles’s testimony, she 
stated that Morales showed up first and that Johnson came by 
later. According to her testimony, the next day when she 
returned home from work, she overheard Johnson telling 
another occupant of the home what he and Morales had done 
to Martinez. Cintron testified that Johnson said that he exited 
the van, confronted the victim, and then proceeded to chase 
and shoot him. 
 
 Mylta Velazquez testified that while she and Johnson 
were watching television several days after the shooting, a 
news report about the shooting came on. She stated that 
Johnson asked her if he could trust her and then admitted to 
being a hit man and to shooting the victim. He also told 
Velazquez about his brief encounter with Shannon Sanders 
just after committing the crime. Velazquez’s trial testimony 
differed from her prior police statement in two respects. First, 
she told the jury that she had seen Johnson with a gun despite 
having denied that in her previous statement to the police. 
Second, she testified that after Johnson was arrested, Sanders 
confided in her that Johnson was the man Sanders had spoken 
                                                 
2Defense counsel also tried to imply during cross-examination 
that Robles had manufactured Johnson’s confession in order 
to be released from jail where he had been held as a material 
witness. However, because Robles first came forward in 
December, months before going to jail as a material witness, 
this tactic was unconvincing. 
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with on the night of the shooting. On cross-examination, 
Velazquez admitted that this was the first time she had told 
anyone of this conversation. Sanders testified that she never 
had any such conversation with Velazquez. 
 
In his closing argument, the District Attorney 
addressed the cross-examination of Robles: 
 
How many of us have been unemployed at 
times in our life [sic]? Does that mean we 
sell drugs? There is no doubt that Mr. 
Robles is not a saint, but for the defense to 
come in here and accuse him of being a 
drug dealer with no evidence other than 
the man is unemployed is wrong. Use your 
common sense. Cell phones and pagers 
alone don’t make people drug dealers. 
And I submit to you that if the man was 
involved in criminal activity, the Reading 
Police would do their [sic] job. 
 
(JA 1408-09).  
 
The jury convicted Johnson of first-degree murder, 
aggravated assault, possession of an instrument of crime, 
possession of a firearm without a license, and related 
conspiracies, on July 14, 1998. Johnson was sentenced to life 
imprisonment without parole for his first-degree murder 
conviction.3
                                                 
3Johnson also received a sentence of death for an unrelated 
conviction, with respect to which he is similarly seeking a 
writ of habeas corpus. The petition is currently stayed, 
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D. Procedural History 
 
Like many habeas corpus petitioners, Johnson has 
transversed a long and circuitous path to reach this court. 
After an unsuccessful direct appeal of his conviction, Johnson 
filed a PCRA petition arguing that his trial counsel was 
ineffective. The Court of Common Pleas denied the petition, 
and the Superior Court affirmed the denial. Johnson then filed 
a second PCRA petition, which he later sought to supplement 
with the first of many Brady allegations.  
 
While his second PCRA petition was under review, 
Johnson filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania on June 25, 2004. His habeas corpus petition 
raised several claims, including allegations that the 
Commonwealth wrongfully withheld impeachment evidence 
related to the Commonwealth’s three primary witnesses—
Robles, Cintron, and Velazquez—in violation of Brady.  
 
 The District Court granted Johnson considerable 
discovery on his Brady claim. Following the 
Commonwealth’s production of previously undisclosed 
evidence at the direction of the District Court, Johnson filed 
three more “protective” PCRA petitions in state court. 
Although Johnson filed five PCRA petitions in total, we need 
only concern ourselves with the last three (collectively, the 
“final PCRA petition”).   
                                                                                                             
pending resolution of Johnson’s PCRA petition by state 
courts. See Johnson v. Beard, No. 03-2156 (E.D. Pa.).  
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The Court of Common Pleas denied Johnson’s final 
PCRA petition. It held that Johnson’s Brady claim was 
untimely under the PCRA because it was filed more than one 
year from the date on which his judgment of sentence became 
final. It further concluded that none of the statutory 
exceptions to the one-year limitations period applied. The 
Superior Court affirmed the denial of the final PCRA petition 
as untimely, culminating Johnson’s post-conviction process in 
state court. 
 
Johnson appeals from the District Court’s November 
2009 order denying his habeas corpus petition with respect to 
his Brady claim, Johnson v. Folino, 671 F. Supp. 2d 658, 674 
(E.D. Pa. 2009), as well as the District Court’s subsequent 
ruling on reconsideration. In its initial decision, the District 
Court began by examining the Superior Court’s denial of 
Johnson’s final PCRA petition. Id. at 668. The District Court 
held that the one-year limitations period with which Johnson 
failed to comply constituted an independent and adequate 
state-law ground for the denial of his PCRA petitions. Id. 
Concluding that Johnson had procedurally defaulted his 
Brady claim, the District Court therefore proceeded to 
analyze whether Johnson could overcome the procedural 
default and obtain federal review of his Brady claim by 
establishing either “cause and prejudice,” which mirrors the 
second and third prongs of a Brady violation—suppression 
and materiality—or a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.” 
Id. at 667-69. 
 
 The District Court held that Johnson could not 
establish both cause and prejudice with respect to the 
undisclosed evidence related to Cintron and Velazquez. It 
concluded that the Commonwealth had not suppressed the 
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fact that the two witnesses were coerced into testifying 
because that information “could have been obtained by 
[Johnson] through the exercise of reasonable diligence, 
including the opportunity to cross-examine during trial.” Id. 
at 671, 673. Further, the District Court held that neither 
Cintron’s involvement in an assault days before her testimony 
nor her prior inconsistent statements about Robles’s 
whereabouts during an unrelated police investigation were 
material for Brady purposes. Id. at 671-72. 
 
 As to the undisclosed evidence related to Robles, the 
District Court held that Johnson could not establish prejudice 
because it concluded that evidence pertaining to Robles’s 
uncharged criminal conduct would have been inadmissible 
under Pennsylvania law to impeach the veracity of a witness 
and therefore was not material for Brady purposes. Id. at 669. 
Even assuming that the evidence was admissible, the District 
Court still considered it immaterial because it perceived two 
flaws in Johnson’s theory that Robles received favorable 
treatment from Reading police in return for assisting in the 
prosecution of others. Id. at 670. First, the District Court 
noted that the Berks County District Attorney’s Office, not 
the Reading Police, makes charging decisions. Id. Second, the 
District Court observed that the evidence is subject to the 
equally plausible inference that insufficient evidence of 
Robles’s criminal activities existed to initiate formal charges 
against him. Id. Therefore, the District Court concluded that 
the evidence “would not ‘put the whole case in such a 
different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.’” Id. 
(quoting Youngblood v. West Virginia, 547 U.S. 867, 870 
(2006)). 
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 In response to Johnson’s motion for reconsideration, 
the District Court altered course with respect to its evaluation 
of the undisclosed evidence related to Robles, reasoning that 
the evidence actually would have been admissible under 
Pennsylvania law to impeach for bias. It also concluded that 
the evidence could be material notwithstanding the flaws it 
had previously identified. Nevertheless, the District Court 
reasoned that the evidence would still be inadmissible 
because it was “extremely speculative, tangential to the issues 
. . . , and was also likely to confuse the jury.” (JA 5). 
Therefore, the District Court did not conduct an explicit 
cumulative prejudice analysis. It again denied Johnson’s 
petition, but granted a certificate of appealability with respect 
to his Brady claim, acknowledging that reasonable jurists 
could disagree with its conclusion and find Johnson entitled 
to habeas relief.  
 
Pursuant to that certificate, Johnson timely filed the 
instant appeal.  
 
II.  Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 
2241(a) and 2254(a), and we have jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253. See Holland v. Horn, 519 F.3d 107, 
111 (3d Cir. 2008).  
 
As the District Court did not conduct an evidentiary 
hearing, our review of its order denying habeas relief is 
plenary. Id. In this case, the state court did not reach the 
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merits of Johnson’s final PCRA petition.4
                                                 
4The Superior Court affirmed the denial of Johnson’s second 
PCRA petition on timeliness grounds. It concluded that the 
governmental-interference exception to the PCRA statute of 
limitations did not apply because Johnson’s “underlying 
Brady claim is meritless.” (JA 92). We recognize that this 
arguably could be considered a ruling on the merits of 
Johnson’s Brady claim. Where a state court adjudicates the 
merits of a habeas petitioner’s claim, under AEDPA, a federal 
court may not grant the petition “unless the adjudication of 
the claim (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or 
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established 
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the 
United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on 
an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 
evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254(d). However, we do not credit the court’s conclusory 
statement as a true merits ruling, and the parties both agree 
that it was merely concluding that it would not recognize an 
exception to the timeliness bar. Accordingly, we need not 
consider whether the Superior Court’s decision implicates 
Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011), or affects the 
procedural default analysis, see Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 
856, 860 (2002) (“Even though [the Arizona state procedural 
rule] does not require a federal constitutional ruling on the 
merits, if the state court’s decision rested primarily on a 
ruling on the merits nevertheless, its decision would not be 
independent of federal law.”).  
 Therefore, “‘the 
deferential standards provided by AEDPA . . . do not apply,’” 
Taylor v. Horn, 504 F.3d 416, 429 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting 
Appel v. Horn, 250 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2001)), and we 
“must conduct a de novo review over pure legal questions and 
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mixed questions of law and fact, as a court would have done 
prior to the enactment of AEDPA,” Appel, 250 F.3d at 210 
(citation omitted). 
 
III. Discussion 
 
The Superior Court denied Johnson’s final PCRA 
petition as untimely under state law. “Where a state court 
refuses to consider a [habeas] petitioner’s claims because of a 
violation of state procedural rules, a federal . . . court is 
[generally] barred by the procedural default doctrine from 
considering the claims.” Johnson v. Pinchak, 392 F.3d 551, 
556 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 262 
(1989)). A federal court may consider the merits of a 
procedurally defaulted claim only if “the petitioner 
establishes ‘cause and prejudice’ or a ‘fundamental 
miscarriage of justice’ to excuse the default.” Holloway v. 
Horn, 355 F.3d 707, 715 n.3 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Coleman 
v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991)). It has been observed 
that the cause and prejudice analysis in a habeas case based 
on Brady parallels two of the three components of the 
underlying alleged Brady violation. Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 
668, 691 (2004).  
 
In Brady, the Supreme Court held that “the 
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an 
accused upon request violates due process where the evidence 
is material either to guilt or to punishment.” 373 U.S. at 87. 
“Impeachment evidence, . . . as well as exculpatory evidence, 
falls within the Brady rule.” United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 
667, 676 (1985). In fact, the prosecution has an affirmative 
“duty to disclose such evidence . . . even though there has 
been no request [for the evidence] by the accused.” Strickler 
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v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280 (1999) (citing United States v. 
Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976)). Indeed, that responsibility 
“encompasses evidence ‘known only to police investigators 
and not to the prosecutor.’” Id. at 280-81 (quoting Kyles v. 
Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 438 (1995)). “In order to comply with 
Brady, therefore, ‘the individual prosecutor has a duty to 
learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on 
the government’s behalf . . . , including the police.’” Id. at 
281 (quoting Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437). However, even when 
the prosecution has failed to disclose favorable evidence to 
the defense, a constitutional violation is not inevitable. A new 
trial will be granted only if: (1) the evidence at issue is 
favorable to the accused; (2) the evidence was suppressed by 
the state; and (3) the evidence is material. See id. at 281-82. 
 
Therefore, as we noted above, “cause and prejudice,” 
which excuse procedural default, mirror the last two elements 
of a Brady violation. This is because in the specific context of 
a Brady claim, “a petitioner shows ‘cause’ when the reason 
for his [default] in state-court proceedings was the State’s 
suppression of the relevant evidence.” Banks, 540 U.S. at 
691. And “coincident with the third Brady component . . . , 
prejudice within the compass of the ‘cause and prejudice’ 
requirement exists when the suppressed evidence is ‘material’ 
for Brady purposes.” Id. 
 
The District Court focused primarily on the prejudice 
prong of the “cause and prejudice” analysis, and we will 
circumscribe our review of the District Court’s decision 
accordingly.5
                                                 
5Johnson, of course, does not confine his arguments of error 
to the issue of prejudice. Nevertheless, prejudice was both the 
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To demonstrate prejudice excusing the procedural 
default of a Brady claim, a habeas petitioner must show that 
the undisclosed evidence is material. “The evidence is 
material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the 
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.” Bagley, 473 U.S. at 
682. “[A] showing of materiality does not require 
demonstration by a preponderance that disclosure of the 
suppressed evidence would have resulted ultimately in the 
defendant’s acquittal . . . .” Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434. Rather, the 
“touchstone of materiality is a ‘reasonable probability’ of a 
different result.” Id. “The question is . . . whether in [the 
evidence’s] absence [the petitioner] received a fair trial, 
understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of 
confidence. A ‘reasonable probability’ of a different result is 
accordingly shown when the government’s evidentiary 
suppression ‘undermines confidence in the outcome of the 
trial.’” Id. (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678).  
 
 “The materiality of Brady material depends almost 
entirely on the value of the evidence relative to the other 
evidence mustered by the state.” Rocha v. Thaler, 619 F.3d 
387, 396 (5th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted). Suppressed evidence that would be 
cumulative of other evidence or would be used to impeach 
                                                                                                             
heart and the bulk of the District Court’s analysis. Because 
we find multiple analytical errors within that analysis that 
merit reversal and remand, we need not address Johnson’s 
other arguments toward that end. Thus, we assume without 
deciding, that the District Court was correct that there were 
adequate and independent state-law grounds for procedural 
default. Harris, 489 U.S. at 262.  
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testimony of a witness whose account is strongly 
corroborated is generally not considered material for Brady 
purposes. Id. at 396-97. Conversely, however, undisclosed 
evidence that would seriously undermine the testimony of a 
key witness may be considered material when it relates to an 
essential issue or the testimony lacks strong corroboration. Id. 
at 397. 
  
A court must “evaluate the tendency and force of the 
undisclosed evidence item by item” to determine whether the 
evidence is material. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 436 n.10. In addition, 
a court must “evaluate its cumulative effect for purposes of 
materiality separately.” Id. Individual items of suppressed 
evidence may not be material on their own, but may, in the 
aggregate, “undermine[] confidence in the outcome of the 
trial.” Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678. 
 
In this case, the District Court concluded that Johnson 
had failed to demonstrate prejudice with respect to the 
suppressed evidence concerning Robles (and to a lesser extent 
Cintron) because in the District Court’s estimation, “the 
alleged Brady evidence would not have been admissible 
despite its potential probative value” as much of it was 
“extremely speculative, tangential to the issues . . . , and was 
also likely to confuse the jury.” (JA 5). Therefore, the District 
Court concluded that an explicit cumulative prejudice 
analysis was unnecessary. (Id.).  
 
Johnson attacks the District Court’s reasoning on 
several bases. First, he argues that the District Court erred 
when it concluded that the suppressed evidence was 
inadmissible. Second, Johnson contends that the District 
Court erred because it never conducted a cumulative 
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prejudice analysis. We agree that the District Court erred in 
both these respects. In essence, we disagree with the 
significance the District Court ascribed to the issue of 
admissibility as well as the District Court’s failure to conduct 
an item-by-item and cumulative evaluation of the suppressed 
evidence.  
 
We begin with the proper role of admissibility in a 
Brady materiality analysis. The District Court was correct that 
admissibility is a consideration that bears on Brady 
materiality. The materiality standard, however, is not 
reducible to a simple determination of admissibility.6
                                                 
6The District Court relied on United States v. Oxman, 740 
F.2d 1298, 1311 (3d Cir. 1984), for the proposition that “[i]n 
order to be material, evidence suppressed must have been 
admissible at trial.” Oxman is of dubious precedential value 
in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. 
Pflaumer, 473 U.S. 922 (1985), vacating and remanding the 
case without opinion for further consideration of Bagley, 473 
U.S. at 667, which is relevant to the cited proposition. 
Moreover, in Oxman we concluded that the suppressed 
evidence was admissible and so we never had occasion to 
consider whether inadmissible evidence may be material 
under Brady. 740 F.2d at 1311. We are not bound by our dicta 
in Oxman. 
 Rather, 
we believe, as do the majority of our sister courts of appeals, 
that inadmissible evidence may be material if it could have 
led to the discovery of admissible evidence. Ellsworth v. 
Warden, 333 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2003) (en banc); United 
States v. Gil, 297 F.3d 93, 104 (2d Cir. 2002); Bradley v. 
Nagle, 212 F.3d 559, 567 (11th Cir. 2000); United States v. 
Phillip, 948 F.2d 241, 249 (6th Cir. 1991). But see Hoke v. 
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Netherland, 92 F.3d 1350, 1356 n.3 (4th Cir. 1996). 
Furthermore, like the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit, we think that inadmissible evidence may be material 
if it could have been used effectively to impeach or corral 
witnesses during cross-examination. Gil, 297 F.3d at 104. 
Thus, the admissibility of the evidence itself is not dispositive 
for Brady purposes. Rather, the inquiry is whether the 
undisclosed evidence is admissible itself or could have led to 
the discovery of admissible evidence that could have made a 
difference in the outcome of the trial sufficient to establish a 
“reasonable probability” of a different result. 
 
Johnson pressed this point at oral argument before us, 
urging that cross-examination might have proceeded 
differently and more effectively if he had been armed with the 
wealth of undisclosed impeachment evidence. For example, 
Johnson could have cross-examined Robles about specific 
instances in which he was approached by the police as a 
person of interest in several felonies. If, in the face of these 
pointed questions, Robles still maintained that he was a law-
abiding citizen without any motivation to manufacture 
testimony against Johnson, Johnson suggests that he could 
have called police officers to testify that Robles was aware 
that he was under investigation and that during the course of 
one such investigation Robles had offered to supply 
information regarding an unrelated murder. Furthermore, 
Johnson urges that the District Attorney would not have been 
able to discount Johnson’s attack on Robles’s credibility in 
his closing argument had Johnson had access to all of the 
impeachment evidence in the possession of the 
Commonwealth.  
 
26 
 
Even if we were to accept the proposition that 
suppressed evidence must be admissible in order to be 
material under Brady—which we do not—we could not 
endorse the District Court’s application of such a principle 
here. To begin, the District Court never “evaluate[d] the 
tendency and force of the undisclosed evidence item by 
item.”7
                                                 
7Although materiality lies at the heart of our decision to 
vacate the judgment of the District Court, we would be remiss 
if we did not address the District Court’s cause analysis. 
While the District Court did not address the suppression issue 
with respect to most of the undisclosed evidence, it did hold 
that Johnson had not established cause as to the evidence that 
Cintron and Velazquez were coerced into testifying. Johnson, 
671 F. Supp. 2d at 671-73. The District Court reasoned that 
the Commonwealth was not required to disclose any coercion 
by the Reading police because that information could have 
been obtained by Johnson through the exercise of reasonable 
diligence, including the opportunity to cross-examine during 
trial. Id. at 671, 673.    
 Kyles, 514 U.S. at 436 n.10. In reaching the 
The rule applied by the District Court overstates what 
sort of evidence is available to a reasonably diligent 
defendant. As Johnson argues, it simply cannot be the case 
that any information possessed by a witness—particularly a 
government witness—is available as long as he or she is 
subject to cross-examination. The Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals has also rejected “as untenable a broad rule that any 
information possessed by a defense witness must be 
considered available to the defense for Brady purposes.”  
Boss v. Pierce, 263 F.3d 734, 740 (7th Cir. 2001).  We agree 
that reasonable diligence does not require defense counsel to 
“ask witnesses about matters of which counsel could not have 
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conclusion that Johnson had failed to establish prejudice, the 
District Court reasoned that “much of the evidence” was 
speculative, tangential, likely to confuse, and therefore 
inadmissible. (JA 5). Such a broad and conclusory ruling fails 
to address the varied nature of the undisclosed evidence in 
this case. On remand, the District Court must evaluate the 
materiality of each item of suppressed evidence individually, 
bearing in mind not only its content, but also where it might 
have led the defense in its efforts to undermine Robles. This 
approach may seem laborious, but as the Supreme Court has 
observed, “there is no other way.” Kyles, 514 U.S. at 436 
n.10. 
 
Moreover, the District Court must consider the 
cumulative effect of all of the evidence that was suppressed 
and favorable to Johnson. Even items of evidence that the 
District Court may not consider material on their own must 
still be considered as part of a cumulative materiality 
analysis.8
                                                                                                             
reasonably expected a witness to have knowledge.”  Id. at 
743. On remand, the District Court should reconsider its 
ruling in light of this more narrow principle. Additionally, the 
District Court might examine what impact the District 
Attorney’s representation that “there ha[d] been no promises 
or inducement to any of the witnesses . . . there [were] no plea 
agreements, there [were] no pending cases . . . and there’s 
been no promise for the testimony [of any witness]” has on 
the cause analysis, if any. (JA 319).  
 Simmons v. Beard, 590 F.3d 223, 237 (3d Cir. 
 
8The District Court discounted a police report documenting 
Cintron’s lie to the police regarding Robles’s whereabouts 
during the investigation of a February 27, 1996 shooting 
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2009); Smith v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 572 F.3d 1327, 1346 
(11th Cir. 2009). “Cumulative analysis of the force and effect 
of the undisclosed pieces of favorable evidence matters 
because the sum of the parts almost invariably will be greater 
than any individual part.” Smith, 572 F.3d at 1347. 
 
Finally, we are troubled by the District Court’s 
unsupported conclusion that the suppressed evidence would 
have been inadmissible. As Johnson points out, and the 
District Court clearly acknowledged, Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court precedent appears to suggest that some, if not all, of the 
undisclosed evidence would have been material impeachment 
evidence.9
                                                                                                             
incident because it alone was not sufficient to establish a 
“reasonable probability” of a different outcome. Johnson, 671 
F. Supp. 2d at 672. On remand, the District Court must still 
consider this item when evaluating the cumulative tendency 
and strength of all the suppressed, favorable evidence.  
 However, while citing this precedent and noting 
 
9The District Court cited Commonwealth v. Williams, 570 
A.2d 75, 80 (Pa. 1990), for the proposition that “a party 
against whom a witness is called always has the right to show 
by cross-examination that a witness is biased.” (JA 4). It also 
quoted language from Commonwealth v. Collins, 545 A.2d 
882, 885 (Pa. 1988), that “[Pennsylvania] law clearly 
establishes that any witness may be impeached by showing 
his bias or hostility, or by proving facts which would make 
such feelings probable.” (JA 4). The District Court did not 
refer to Commonwealth v. Evans, 512 A.2d 626 (Pa. 1986), 
which arguably provides even stronger support for Johnson’s 
position. In Evans, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that 
the state’s constitution guarantees the right of a criminal 
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the “opportunity” and “right” to impeach for bias that is 
guaranteed to a defendant, it seems not to have considered 
and did not discuss the importance and critical nature of this 
type of evidence. Instead, the District Court characterized the 
evidence as tangential, speculative, and confusing. Neither 
the District Court nor the Commonwealth cite any legal 
authority supporting its inadmissibility as a matter of state 
law. The role of the District Court was to follow relevant 
Pennsylvania law at the time of Johnson’s trial.10
                                                                                                             
defendant to cross-examine a witness about “outstanding 
criminal charges or . . . non-final criminal disposition[s] 
against him within the same jurisdiction,” because of the 
potential for bias, “[e]ven if the prosecutor has made no 
promises, either on the present case or on other pending 
criminal matters, [since] the witness may hope for favorable 
treatment from the prosecutor if the witness presently testifies 
in a way that is helpful to the prosecution.”  Id. at 631. This 
right “is not to be denied or abridged because incidentally 
facts may be developed that are irrelevant to the issue and 
prejudicial to the other party.” Id. at 632 (internal quotations 
marks omitted).  
 To be clear, 
we do not hold that the undisclosed evidence is admissible as 
a matter of state law. Indeed, the District Court as a trial court 
is in a much better position to make admissibility 
determinations than we are as a reviewing court. 
Nevertheless, whatever the District Court’s ruling as to 
 
10We are also puzzled by the Commonwealth’s reliance on 
the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence to support its argument 
that the evidence was inadmissible because the Rules were 
not effective until October 1, 1998, after Johnson’s trial.  
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admissibility of the undisclosed evidence is on remand, it 
must find some basis in state law.11
 
  
IV. Conclusion 
 
Johnson argues that because the District Court’s 
“prejudice” analysis is subject to de novo review, we should 
act to correct the District Court’s errors by granting the writ 
of habeas corpus ourselves. However, we believe that it is the 
District Court that should evaluate Johnson’s claim anew in 
light of our opinion today. With no physical or eyewitness 
evidence connecting Johnson to the shooting, we think the 
potential impact of the undisclosed impeachment evidence 
deserves a hard look, bearing in mind that ultimately, “[t]he 
                                                 
11We note that the admissibility issues in this case are far less 
clear than those presented in Brady, 373 U.S. at 90 and Wood 
v. Bartholomew, 516 U.S. 1, 5-8 (1995) (holding that the 
failure of the prosecution to disclose that a witness had taken 
a polygraph test was not material under Brady where the 
parties agreed that the results of the test were inadmissible 
under state law). In Brady, the Supreme Court concluded that 
the state court had in fact already ruled on the issue of 
admissibility and so considered that ruling despite its 
reticence to delve into questions of state law. 373 U.S. at 90. 
In Wood, the undisclosed polygraph results would not have 
led to admissible evidence, but instead, could only have been 
relevant to contradict witness testimony and both parties 
agreed that the results were not admissible for any purpose, 
including impeachment. 516 U.S. at 6. This case is a far cry 
from Wood and Brady—there has been no state court ruling 
as to the admissibility of the suppressed evidence nor do the 
parties agree on the issue. 
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question is . . . whether in [the evidence’s] absence [the 
petitioner] received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting 
in a verdict worthy of confidence.” Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434. 
We will remand so that the District Court can consider all 
paths to materiality discussed above, in addition to any others 
that Johnson can identify. We are a reviewing court and the 
resolution of the issues discussed herein will benefit from 
two-tiered review. Smith, 572 F.3d at 1348-49. 
 
We reiterate that this is not the usual § 2254 habeas 
corpus case in which we confine our review to the state court 
record before us. The substantial impeachment evidence of 
the Commonwealth’s star witness was only uncovered during 
the discovery process in federal court. Therefore, we have no 
reason to review the rulings made by the state court nor 
consider their propriety. Instead, our role as a federal court is 
limited to weighing the impact the undisclosed evidence 
could have had at Johnson’s trial against the case presented 
by the Commonwealth and the defense mounted by Johnson 
to determine “whether in [the evidence’s] absence [Johnson] 
received a fair trial.” Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434. 
 
In light of this newly disclosed evidence, and the 
relative paucity of other evidence connecting Johnson to the 
murder of Martinez, could confidence in the verdict be 
undermined? That question is more properly addressed by the 
District Court in the first instance. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the 
judgment of the District Court and remand for further 
proceedings consistent herewith. 
 
